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State Power within European Integration
On the limits and context of Germany’s power in the Union
by Josef Janning
Germany is widely perceived to be calling the shots in Europe’s sovereign debt crisis management, 
and maybe in the EU in general. But a state’s influence in the union is complex and also contex-
tual. Clearly, though, state power seems to have regained prominence in the European debate. How 
much power have member states retained, or perhaps even won, in the process of  integration—and 
what does power in the Union look like? Five theses on power in today’s European Union.
When in June 1984 Margret Thatcher secured 
a substantial rebate on Britain’s contribution to 
the EU budget, it was widely viewed as a shrewd 
expression of  the power member states could still 
wield within the framework of  European integra-
tion. The Fontainebleau Agreement seemed a clear 
case of  horse-trading, initiated with the British 
prime minister’s now famous goal: “I want my 
money back!” Her government aimed to receive a 
total refund on the UK’s net payments into the EU 
budget, based on the lower benefits Britain enjoyed 
from the Common Agricultural Policy. Eventually 
she managed to raise the rebate the UK had been 
granted when it joined the European Community 
from 50 percent to 66 percent. The outcome was 
a classic European compromise. It gave to the 
UK a substantial discount on its membership fees 
(these were to go on the tab of  other member 
states), but it also locked the EU into an already 
ageing policy scheme. The compromise forestalled 
reform of  agricultural policies, which to this day 
remain largely untouched. It also led other member 
states to demand their own reductions in member-
ship fees. Instead of  using the budget leverage to 
drive reforms, the UK leveraged its power toward 
unilateral advantage. This lesson of  Fontainebleau 
was brought to mind again the other week in the 
debates surrounding the costs of  Baroness Thatch-
er’s funeral. Foreign Secretary William Hague 
argued that, in light of  the 75 billion pounds her 
efforts had saved Britain since 1984, the UK gov-
ernment “can afford to contribute to a funeral.”
To be sure, Thatcher’s approach at Fontainebleau 
was in no way an exception in EU policymaking. It 
brings to mind Charles De Gaulle’s policy of  the 
“empty chair” in the 1960s, which was solved by 
another power-preserving agreement, the Luxem-
bourg Compromise of  1966. To reconcile the grad-
ual introduction of  majority voting in the Council 
of  Ministers with member state interests, the com-
promise stated:  “Where, in the case of  decisions 
which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal 
of  the Commission, very important interests of  
one or more partners are at stake, the members of  
the council will endeavor, within a reasonable time, 
to reach solutions which can be adopted by all 
the members of  the council while respecting their 
mutual interests and those of  the Community.” A 
similar accord was reached at Ioannina in 1994 to 
preserve the veto power of  23 votes in light of  EU 
enlargement. As the EU grew, frustrations over a 
dilution of  voting power also drove the contro-
versial vote-weighting negotiations at Nice and 
continued to be a major issue in the debates over 
the Lisbon Treaty. Member states large and small, 
integrationist and integration-skeptic, have used 
their veto options, and the past 15 years have seen 
vetoes becoming more frequent.1
In light of  the current debate within the European 
Union, all of  the above appears trivial. In the eyes 
of  many Europeans, the EU today is run by Ger-
many. The block’s largest economy is perceived 
to be calling the shots in the sovereign debt crisis 
management in a manner that many see as primar-
ily driven by its own national interests and domes-
tic debates. Indeed, a rough attribution of  power 
indicators to a select number of  EU member states 
supports the thesis of  German hegemony. Power, 
however, is at least as much a contextual resource 
as it is a matter of  size and numbers.
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This raises the question of  what power member 
states have actually retained or won in the process 
of  integration. What are a state’s resources in a 
supra-national environment, and how does it play 
out at the negotiating tables in Brussels? Accord-
ing to its classic definition, power is the ability of  
A to get B to do X, which B would otherwise not 
have done. What does this look like inside the EU? 
In terms of  integration, is power the ability to get 
what you want? Or is it the ability to get things 
done?
Here are five theses seeking to map power in 
today’s European Union.
Thesis 1: Sovereign power did not 
wither away in the EU.
From its beginnings, European integration has 
been both an instrument of  member state interest 
and status and a post-national model of  pooling 
and sharing sovereignty. In an “ever deeper” union, 
the former would—so it was assumed—give way 
to the latter. After decades of  functional spillover 
of  integration from one policy area to others, that 
might have been the case if  membership had not 
more than quadrupled and if  the wall dividing Ber-
lin, Germany, and Europe had remained standing. 
All of  the EU’s strong supranational projects either 
date back to 1989 or had essentially been formu-
lated before then. Since this watershed in modern 
European history, intergovernmental cooperation—
or disagreement—defines the pace of  the Euro-
pean project. And with it, the power of  member 
states has grown, bringing back the asymmetries of  
size and weight as a structuring feature of  political 
bargaining.
Thesis 2: Size matters.
Differences in economic strength, demographics, 
foreign policy influence, and international status 
have more impact now than they did in the earlier 
days of  integration. The community of  six was 
composed of  three large member states and three 
smaller ones. France was the strongest among them 
because it pursued the most independent foreign 
policy, but it was a committed and indispensable 
player in building European integration. West 
Germany’s economic strength was balanced by its 
foreign policy limitations. Its strong pro-integration 
stance made it both an essential partner for France 
and for the Benelux countries, which by and large 
shared most West German preferences on eco-
nomic and trade policies. Northern Italy, as it grew 
dynamically, was mostly focused on the German 
market.
France and Germany were the key brokers of  
agreement within that original community. Their 
differences represented the cleavages among the six, 
and their determination to come to terms (which 
marked the true strength of  the Franco-German 
partnership) represented the community spirit.
The current European Union is light years away 
from those days. Though it now has many more 
small and smaller members than it once did (or 
maybe because of  this), gravity has shifted to 
the large member states instead of  putting the 
smaller states—who are in the majority—in the 
lead. Treaty changes have been made to maintain 
at least in part the blocking position of  large mem-
ber states under the rules of  Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV) in the Council of  Ministers, but 
QMV application has seen a growing number of  
large member state interventions to prevent a vote 
against their explicit preferences. Since the early 
1990s, the number of  opt-outs from treaty obliga-
tions or EU policies has risen significantly, as some 
member states are unwilling to see their sovereignty 
constrained. Three clusters of  member state power 
have emerged.
The first cluster is made up of  the Integration 
Builders—i. e., those member states actively pursu-
ing an integration agenda and engaged in defin-
ing outcomes. The most powerful of  among 
these—France, Germany, Italy, sometimes Spain, 
and recently also Poland—are those states who are 
indispensable to achieving a relevant consensus and 
a voting weight that could bring others around.
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The second cluster consists of  Coalition Builders—
i. e., the member states that define their own politi-
cal position explicitly as being in the center of  bar-
gaining. This group usually but not always consists 
of  the member states in the first group—the Inte-
gration Builders—plus a number of  smaller and 
small member states, which prefer joint solutions. 
Large member states usually need to be part of  any 
successful coalition. Germany and France would 
regularly have to be in. The Benelux countries 
used to be classic members of  this group, highly 
engaged in coalition building and the development 
of  compromise among interests. A significant 
source of  power for these actors was derived from 
their experience and credibility. Often, it was their 
engagement that helped resolve conflicts of  inter-
est among large member states..
The third cluster is made up of  the Veto Players—
i. e., those member states that pursue their interests 
primarily by denying agreement or preventing 
deepening of  integration. Among them, the UK 
certainly carries the biggest weight. This also 
applies to blocking coalitions; if  they wanted to 
prevail, the UK had to be in. On the other hand, 
this power to veto has been and still is used by 
many smaller and small member states. Instead of  
engaging in compromise building (which would 
also commit them to the proposed deal), they 
tend to stand on the margins of  the negotiations 
and wait for the moment in which the “builders” 
seek their consent. Then they seek concessions in 
their favor in return for accepting the compromise. 
Logrolling across dossiers and package deals are 
the result of  such power politics inside the EU. 
The number and sometimes dysfunctional effect 
of  Veto Players are indicative of  the continuing 
relevance of  member state sovereignty. Spain and 
Greece both have practiced this role extensively; 
Poland and others among the new member states 
have tried it out as well; a few member states, 
notably Greece, have used unanimity requirements 
to veto most EU initiatives regarding Turkey and 
Turkish accession, as well as to exert influence on 
the Cyprus issue.
Thesis 3: Veto power has outgrown 
coalition power.
The previous thesis illustrates the role of  coali-
tion building in the process of  integration. In fact, 
whatever the spillover impact of  sectorial integra-
tion has been, it needed coalitions among member 
states to turn the impulse into treaty language and 
practice. The more stable and comprehensive these 
coalitions have been, the more defining power they 
could apply. Successful coalitions would seek to 
integrate the ambitions of  large member states to 
give them incentives to engage. The ambiguous or 
utilitarian positions of  other member states rein-
forced the role of  coalitions, as they could control 
the centrifugal tendencies of  an enlarging Euro-
pean Union.
Eastern enlargement has changed that. The much 
larger number of  member states has lead to a 
growing heterogeneity, which limits coalition 
options. The traditional “builders’ coalition” cen-
tered around Germany, France, and Benelux has 
not benefitted from enlargement so far—with 
the notable exception of  Poland under the Tusk 
government. The number of  demandeurs on EU-
funded support has clearly grown, but internal 
divisions and competition among member states 
in the East and South mitigates its impact. Mean-
while, due to massive shifts in the party structures 
of  some of  the old member states, the founding 
members have ceased to play a powerful role. Italy 
drifted off  during the Berlusconi years; Belgium 
has been preoccupied with its internal frictions; 
recent Dutch governments have all been less inte-
grationist than their predecessors. These changes 
could well have been fueled by more “normal” 
behavior on the part of  Germany as a large mem-
ber state—i. e., by a German position centered on 
the country’s immediate national interests with less 
emphasis on preserving a responsive milieu within 
the EU. This has been mirrored to some degree by 
similar behavior on the part of  the French.
The category of  power that has grown in relative 
terms is thus the power to say “no.” Unilateral 
steps on Schengen by France, Italy, and Denmark, 
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driven by domestic debates; the British claim for 
renegotiation of  the treaties in order to repatriate 
powers assigned to the EU; the German delays 
on measures to manage the sovereign debt crisis; 
the net payers’ insistence on the EU’s multi-annual 
financial framework. All of  these signal a trend 
toward the articulation of  negative power.
Thesis 4: Current integration 
 marginalizes smaller and peripheral 
member states.
It may appear counterintuitive, and it proves wrong 
many predictions of  the last treaty reform/enlarge-
ment rounds, but the power position of  smaller 
member states has not improved with enlargement 
to the East, as many of  the new members are 
resource-weak and rely on transfers from Brussels. 
The interaction among them is not strong and not 
structured. In order to shape outcomes, they need 
to either become part of  a shaping coalition (the 
terms of  which will largely be defined by the large 
member states present in the coalition) or join a 
veto group, which again would have to include the 
UK or another large member states in order to 
prevail.
A decisive factor of  member state power has been 
the introduction of  variable geometry. While there 
have not been strong cases of  reinforced coopera-
tion under the treaties, the impact of  flexibility has 
mostly been felt in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and in the Schengen regime. Reinforced 
by the sovereign debt crisis, the EMU has in effect 
created a membership class of  its own, limiting the 
ability of  non-Euro states to shape EMU devel-
opment, even by separate agreement such as the 
Fiscal Compact if  need be. Both Eurogroup and 
the European Council formation of  the Eurozone 
have established their own presidencies, which has 
significance for top-level positions in the EU at 
large. Schengen is a prime example of  the forma-
tive power of  member states. Launched as an inter-
governmental agreement among a core group of  
large and smaller member states, it de facto defined 
the future EU regime on the free movement of  
people and related legal, criminal, and consular 
issues.
The Lisbon Treaty has been another factor in limit-
ing the power of  smaller states. It has marginal-
ized the rotating presidency of  the Council of  the 
European Union, which still exists but has less 
impact on EU policymaking than it used to, due to 
shifting weights in favor of  the European Coun-
cil, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament. Future QMV rules as of  2014 and 2017 
will to a certain degree reestablish the strength of  
builders’ coalitions centered around three or four 
large member states and respectively limit blocking 
minorities. Also, the budget will become subject 
to QMV, taking another albeit mostly theoretical 
veto power away from smaller member states. A 
significant change has come with the introduction 
of  permanent chairs for the European Council and 
the Foreign Affairs Council. These presidencies 
take away the broker’s role played in the past by 
smaller and highly experienced countries. Notably, 
the Benelux countries but also member states such 
as Austria, Sweden, and Finland have lost oppor-
tunities to win credit and recognition through suc-
cessful conflict management among large members 
or between diverging groups of  member states. 
Nowadays, the president of  the European Council 
and the high representative take these roles.
Thesis 5: Intergovernmentalism 
wins over supranationalism
Finally, a review of  the past two decades reveals a 
shift in the paradigm of  integration. The trend of  
a gradual strengthening of  the supranational layers 
of  the European Union has come to a standstill—
if  not a reversal. True, integration always walked on 
one intergovernmental leg, but the supranational 
one was clearly growing. The single market prob-
ably marked the peak of  this trend. Not that there 
have been no projects of  supranational quality 
since then, but the difference lies in the manage-
ment. EMU and Schengen, after its integration into 
the treaties, or the strengthening of  the EU’s for-
eign and security policy and its defense policy, are 
essentially managed by the member states with a 
supporting function of  the European Commission 
and a sideline role for the European Parliament. 
The “Union Method,” as Chancellor Angela Merkel 
called it in her Bruges speech, has put the “meth-
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ode Monnet” in second place, and with it limited 
the power of  the Monnet institution, the European 
Commission.
At the same time, the challenges of  EU policymak-
ing—be it sovereign debt, refugees and welfare 
migration, or Libya—make clear how hard it is to 
run these projects of  deeper integration by com-
mittee. Rather, such crises have reinforced the 
perception of  power asymmetries among member 
states and burdened the management with mistrust. 
Power matters greatly, but no single actor could 
really shape events other than by the threat of  
blocking decision making.
In summary, the power argument is a difficult case 
to make. Power in EU policymaking exists and is 
applied, but its measure is more complex within an 
integration environment such as the EU compared 
to the broader realm of  international relations. 
Member state power in the EU is more than the 
chance to win a vote (which could be calculated 
mathematically, also including clusters of  prefer-
ence and choice.)2 Its essence lies in anticipation, 
in the perception of  strength, preference, options, 
and partners of  one actor in the eyes of  others. 
This is where the importance of  leadership comes 
in—a rather volatile category, since it depends on 
personality, coincidence, domestic factors and, not 
least, the electoral cycle.
An objective measure of  power hardly exists. In 
its absence, the table below tries to approximate 
the impact of  some member states within the EU 
policy process through a mix of  quantitative and 
qualitative arguments. Not surprisingly, Germany 
emerges as the member state with the most power 
resources, though it is not really in a class of  its 
own. The table suggests that others could eas-
ily match the German leverage were they to join 
forces. A positioning in the political center of  the 
EU amplifies member power assets; a stance on 
the margins of  integration shows the reverse effect. 
This is what led Spain in the later years of  Felipe 
Gonzales’ government to explicitly move into the 
center of  EU policymaking. The pattern was fol-
lowed by Poland under Donald Tusk two decades 
later.
Josef Janning is Mercator Fellow, Alfred von 
Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies at 
the DGAP.
Notes
1 For a systematic analysis see the study by Jonathan B. 
Slapin, Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European 
Union, 2011.
2 See for example Jason Barr and Francesco Passarelli, 
“Who has the power in the EU?,” in: Mathematical Social 
Sciences 3/2009, pp. 339–66.
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Power Calculator
The table is meant to visualize the power differen-
tials among EU member states, combing a set of  
quantitative and qualitative variables. The calculator 
attempts to find the balance between the equality 
of  member states as sovereign states and “masters 
of  the treaties” on the one hand, and their obvious 
asymmetries in size, strength, and political influ-
ence. It should be read as an indicator only because 
of  the fluid and contextual nature of  power and 
influence in a framework as dense, treaty-based, 
and process-rich as the current European Union.
All values assigned for the criteria used are rounded. 
The calculator uses the size of  population and the 
member states’ contribution to the EU budget as 
its principle determinants. In political interactions 
power  is not generally quantified. Often, demo-
graphic and economic weight is used as a “currency 
of  power,” particularly in the European context, in 
which the population ratios are seen as a fair indi-
cator of  the power differentials. The calculator uses 
the share of  a member state population, divided by 
2, and adds 1 point to avoid numbers smaller than 
one. As for economic strength, the calculator looks 
at a member state’s share in the EU budget because 
it reflects a) the relative size of  member state GDP, 
and b) the rebate arrangements. The resulting num-
ber is divided by 2, with values below 0.5 being set 
to 0 points in the table.
Two additional qualitative criteria are used in the 
first section of  the calculator, which refer to more 
general aspects of  power: military strength and 
status in international affairs. The judgments for 
both criteria are somewhat subjective judgements. 
Military strength is assessed on factors such as the 
size of  the armed forces, its operational capabili-
ties, possession of  Weapons of  Mass Destruction 
(WMD), force projection capabilities, and its over-
all relevance to an EU defense posture. To keep 
military strength in perspective, the highest score 
in this segment is set to 5 points (would the EU 
pursue fully fledged defense integration, the highest 
score would have to be set to 8 points, correspond-
ing to the score for euro participation). Interna-
tional status is measured by the role and status of  
member states in UN system, membership of  G-8 
& G-20, and their relevance in international rela-
tions, with a maximum score of  5 points.
A fifth general aspect of  power can be found in the 
geographic location of  member states within the 
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EU. The density of  cross border interaction, which 
Karl W. Deutsch described as a key indicator for 
integration many years ago, serves as the defining 
factor. Member states with many EU neighbors 
by and large use the EU more strongly to manage 
these interactions. The value of  center/periph-
ery location is determined rather simplistically by 
counting the number of  immediate EU neighbors, 
an then dividing this by two.
Net Contribution Position
A relevant factor in EU policy making has been 
the net contribution position of  member states. 
The main reason for this would be the continued 
debates about adjustments payments through 
rebates. Looking at net positions (contributions 
to, minus transfers from, the EU budget), any 
rebate to one member state will have to be paid 
for primarily by the net-payers. Large net positions 
are strong arguments in budget debates, not least 
because they sell well among one’s own population. 
The calculator takes the net payment figures in bil-
lion euro, divided by 2, adding 1 point if  the result 
is positive (net-payer position), subtracting 1 point 
if  the result is negative (net-receiving position).
Opt-outs
Since the ratification of  the Maastricht Treaty, opt-
outs have become an important feature of  mem-
ber state engagement in the EU. Opt-outs mean 
non-participation in a given field of  EU policy, 
abstention from respective debates, negotiations 
and decisions, which combined, limits the role and 
influence of  the member state opting out. The 
calculator uses the currently agreed opt-out as of  
spring 2013, disregarding the announcement of  
the UK government to opt out of  all crime and 
policing laws in 2014. Opt-out areas covered here 
are: Schengen, EMU, Charta of  fundamental rights, 
and areas of  freedom, security and justice. States 
are scored -1 point per opt-out used (Sweden is 
counted here as -1, although, strictly speaking, Swe-
den has not opted out from the euro but fails to 
implement its treaty obligation). Neutrality could 
be seen as another field for opting out. It has less 
meaning today since both Sweden and Austria 
have found a way to cooperate under CFSP or 
ESDP. It does however limit their leverage in the 
NATO / EU context. States are scored -1 point 
when they have neutrality clauses drawn up with 
regard to CFSP and/or ESDP.
Good Governance
Domestic reforms have assumed greater relevance 
in the course of  the sovereign debt crisis; their 
impact on EU policy-making, however, goes back 
to the Lisbon Strategy. Modern and efficient gover-
nance of  public affairs and social policy, economic 
competitiveness, good performance on education 
and R&D are summed up into the Europe 2020 
targets. The calculator uses the competitiveness 
assessment regularly carried out by the World Eco-
nomic Forum (WEF), breaking down its ranking 
table into groups of  five (1-5 = 5 points, 6-10= 4 
points, … 20-25= 1 point), minus 1 point (max. 
score = 4 points).
Schengen and EMU
Schengen membership essentially represented an 
opt-in by member states before it became part of  
the treaties. It is a good case of  coalition power 
within the EU, because the participating member 
states effectively defined the outcome, which later 
became the basis for EU policy. The scoring is 
2 points for each member state participating in 
Schengen. Full participation in EMU surely is of  
higher significance for the power position of  mem-
ber states, not least because of  the special pro-
cesses and bodies that govern EMU. Since EMU 
has been signed by all member states, all are subject 
to the general provisions, but those not using the 
euro clearly have less weight. Full membership is 
rated at 4 points, doubled if  the member state is 
indispensable to the existence and continuation of  
the single currency. Member states currently under 
support schemes lose 4 points if  they are under 
an umbrella agreement (such as Greece), and 2 
points if  under a partial support agreement (such 
as Spain).
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Capacity for Coalition Building
The means to build and sustain majority coalitions 
has to be considered one of  the essential power 
resources of  member states in the EU. It is rather 
difficult to measure considering the many dossiers 
and policy areas of  European integration and the 
varying performance of  member states over time. 
The calculator’s assessment reflects my best judg-
ment of  the “sum” the member states’ records 
over a longer period of  time with no empirical 
backup. Values are assigned in two brackets: 4 
points if  a member state is essential to majority 
coalitions and 2 points if  they are only deemed 
important, adding 4 points or 2 points respectively 
for a strong or weak coalition record.
Public Opinion
Finally, the general attitude of  domestic public 
opinion is considered. If  drawn from Euroba-
rometer findings, one would have to look for the 
long-term pattern and not just current figures. The 
assessment here applies a rule of  thumb using a 
rather basic spread of  EU-bias from very positive 
(3 points) to very negative (-3 points). The num-
ber assigned to the countries in question could be 
debated; the calculator assigns +3 points only to 
Luxembourg, the lowest mark, given to the UK, is 
-1 point.
